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WIKILEAKS:  BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
In July 2010,  Private First Class Bradley Manning released thou-
sands of classified documents with the help of WikiLeaks, a private web-
site created to expose government and corporate corruption.  During the 
months that followed, WikiLeaks disseminated several thousand addi-
tional classified documents, including the whereabouts of U.S. troops and 
diplomatic cables.  Public concern grew over the rapid release of the 
documents into Internet space.  Lawmakers and government officials 
questioned whether the release of such information would compromise 
national security and foreign relations and violate the Espionage Act of 
1917.  While not all of the information distributed by WikiLeaks violated 
the law, the vast majority of the documents should not have been re-
leased.  If asked, the Supreme Court should hold that WikiLeaks did vio-
late the Espionage Act, and should be held accountable.  Furthermore, 
lawmakers should change the existing laws to conform to modern times 
by including sections regarding the dissemination of classified informa-
tion over the Internet. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the click of a mouse, it is now possible to access anything—a 
video of a friend across the country, a favorite recipe, or a street view of a 
city thousands of miles away.  The Internet has created a realm of opportu-
nities and access to an abundance of information that was unimaginable 
only two decades ago.  For the most part, this information is incredibly 
beneficial—in an instant, people can easily keep in touch with their friends 
or find the nearest Starbucks––but few people imagined that the same click 
of a mouse could also allow a foreign enemy to instantaneously access 
classified national security information. 
On July 25, 2010, this scenario became a reality when Private First 
Class Bradley Manning released thousands of classified documents through 
WikiLeaks,1 a website that encourages whistleblowers2 to share documents 
                                                           
1.  Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry into Disclosure of Reports to WikiLeaks, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at A4; Christine Delargy, Impact of Leaked WikiLeaks Docs Still Un-
  
238 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:239 
in order to expose government or corporate misconduct.3  This incident 
immediately garnered national attention and reignited an ongoing debate 
regarding the tension between the First Amendment4 and the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”)5 on the one hand, and the need for national secu-
rity on the other.6 
WikiLeaks, a website registered in Sweden and run by The Sunshine 
Press,7 leaks mass amounts of information regarding places where govern-
ments, corporations, and institutions are under intense scrutiny by the 
global community.8  Australian citizen Julian Assange founded the site in 
2006 and is considered the website’s public face.9  While the site’s primary 
objective is “exposing oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet Bloc, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East,”10 it also encourages users from 
any region to provide documents for release.11  The site asserts that such 
                                                           
certain, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011720-
503544.html. 
2.  A “whistleblower” is “one who reveals something covert or who informs against an-
other.”  Whistleblower Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1348 (10th 
ed. 1999).  In this Comment, the term whistleblower will refer to individuals who provide infor-
mation about the government to WikiLeaks.  
3.  See About:  What Is WikiLeaks? § 3.2, WIKILEAKS, 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/About.html (last visited July 31, 2011); Ashley Fantz, WikiLeaks’ Grow-
ing Impact, CNN NEWS BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010, 1:35 PM), 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/11/29/what-is-wikileaks-2/.  WikiLeaks’ original website at 
www.wikileaks.org has been removed from the Internet; the website’s information has been 
moved over to “mirror” websites, primarily to  www.wikileaks.ch.  While most of the WikiLeaks 
content remains the same, the website’s original “About Us” and “Introduction to WikiLeaks” 
articles cease to exist as they did in July 2010. 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
5.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (requiring government agencies, in 
certain circumstances, to disclose information to the public). 
6.  See generally Kristen Wyatt, Sotomayor to Denver Students:  WikiLeaks Supreme 
Court Case Likely, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/26/sotomayor-to-denver-stude_n_696253.html; Gilead 
Light, WikiLeaks:  Lawbreaker?  Website that Releases U.S. Government Secrets May Be Pro-
tected from Prosecution, BALT. SUN, Sept. 2, 2010, at 17; Bumiller, supra note 1. 
7.  About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3, § 1.5; see also WikiLeaks and the Sunshine 
Press, EDUCATIONAL CYBERPLAYGROUND (Mar. 27, 2010, 11:47 PM), http://blog.edu-
cyberpg.com/2010/03/28/Wiki+Leaks+And+The+Sunshine+Press.aspx (“Our publisher, The 
Sunshine Press, is an international non-profit organization funded by human rights campaigners, 
investigative journalists, technologists, lawyers and the general public.”).  
8.  About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3.  
9.  Fantz, supra note 3.  
10.  See Unpluggable;  How WikiLeaks Embarrassed and Enraged America, Gripped the 
Public and Rewrote the Rules of Diplomacy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2010, at 33; WikiLeaks, 
RATIONALWIKI, http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/WikiLeaks (last modified Feb. 9, 2011) (originally 
available at http://WikiLeaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About). 
11.  About:  What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3, § 1.3. 
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exposure leads to “reduced corruption, better government[,] and stronger 
democracies.”12  Furthermore, WikiLeaks contends that by providing 
documents and information to the international community, it is furthering 
the principle “that it is not only the people of one country that [sic] keep 
their government honest, but also the people of other countries who are 
watching that government.”13 
Scrutiny both by a country’s citizens and the international community 
is important, and at times necessary, to ensure a government is free of cor-
ruption; however, “[t]he unveiling of government secrets through the media 
channels has long been a controversial issue.”14  Now more than ever, web-
sites such as WikiLeaks pose a significant threat to national security in the 
United States, predominantly because the general public can intentionally 
disseminate documents and information via the Internet within seconds.  
The First Amendment was established to ensure the freedom of the press 
and allow citizens to expose and criticize the government.15  Later, Con-
gress created the FOIA, grounded in the underlying principle that people 
have the right to obtain information from their government.  Accordingly, 
the FOIA requires the U.S. government and its agencies to release docu-
ments and information to the public.16  However, an appropriate balance 
must be struck, as it is equally important to withhold classified documents 
and information when disclosure could compromise national security.17 
Such concern for national security has led commentators and gov-
ernment organizations alike to propose the imposition of a prior restraint on 
classified information distributed by sites such as WikiLeaks.18  Jeh Char-
les Johnson, general counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, wrote on 
behalf of the department, “[t]he department demands that nothing further 
be released by WikiLeaks, that all of the U.S. government classified docu-
                                                           
12.  WikiLeaks, supra note 10.  
13.  About WikiLeaks, TACTICAL MEDIA FILES, 
http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?objectnumber=47815 (last visited July 31, 2011). 
14.  Doug Meier, Note, Changing with the Times:  How the Government Must Adapt to 
Prevent the Publication of Its Secrets, 28 REV. LITIG. 203, 205 (2008).  
15.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971). 
16.  Memorandum from Ramsey Clark, Att’y Gen.’s Memorandum on the Pub. Info. Sec-
tion of the Admin. Procedure Act (June 1967) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/67agmemo.htm (“This legislation springs from one of our most essen-
tial principles:  a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security 
of the Nation permits.”). 
17.  Id.  (“[T]he welfare of the Nation or the rights of individuals may require that some 
documents not be made available.  As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there must be 
military secrets.”). 
18.  Adam Entous, Pentagon Rebuffs Negotiations with WikiLeaks, WALL ST. J. WASH. 
WIRE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/08/18/pentagon-
rebuffs-wikileaks-request-for-help/. 
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ments that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that 
WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.”19  
The issue has not yet been brought before the U.S. Supreme Court; how-
ever, the Court has previously held that due to the longstanding essential 
role of free speech and press in the U.S. democracy, “‘[a]ny system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity.’ . . . The Government ‘thus carries a 
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a re-
straint.’”20  With such a heavy burden weighing on the government, the 
military’s request to stop the dissemination of its classified documents may 
not prevail.  Conversely, the contents of the leaks juxtaposed with the me-
dium by which the documents were and will continue to be disseminated—
that is, the Internet—presents new concerns that may allow the government 
to justify a prior restraint. 
The mass leak of military documents and diplomatic cables highlights 
the problems with the release of classified information over the Internet.  
First, the document leaks pose threats to national security.21  While infor-
mation regarding the general operations of American soldiers is important 
to facilitate public scrutiny and debate, tactical details chronicled in the Af-
ghan War Diary 2004–2010 (“Afghan War Diary”)22 could provide ene-
mies with too much information about soldiers, consequently endangering 
those soldiers’ lives.23  The leaked documents also included videos and 
other information detailing American war strategies in Afghanistan,24 
which, if received by foreign enemies, might be life-threatening and could 
significantly hinder international war efforts against the Taliban and other 
                                                           
19.  Id. 
20.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 
58, 70 (1963) and Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
21.  Geoff Morrell, The Defense Department’s Response, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at 
A9 (“By disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks continues to put at risk the lives of our 
troops, their coalition partners and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us.”); see Tom Vanden 
Brook, Pentagon Braces for WikiLeaks Disclosure on Iraq, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-10-19-wikileaks19_ST_N.htm; see also Delargy, 
supra note 1.   
22.  Afghan War Diary, 2004–2010, WIKILEAKS, 
http://mirror.wikileaks.info/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,_2004-2010/ (last visited July 31, 2011) 
(describing the Afghan War Diary as a detailed compilation of thousands of documents that pro-
vide a dismal picture of the War in Afghanistan.  The documents were released by the WikiLeaks 
website on July 25, 2010, sparking a debate over their legality as free speech and press or, alter-
natively, as the illegal leaking of classified documents.  The information in the documents in-
cludes names and location of soldiers, videos, and other details of the war.). 
23.  Gates:  Posting Classified War Documents Was Morally Wrong, CNN, Aug. 1, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/08/01/gates.wikileaks/index.html. 
24.  See Afghan War Diary, 2004–2010, supra note 22. 
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terrorist organizations.25  As a result, the United States may be forced to al-
ter war strategies or retreat entirely from various locations identified in the 
disclosed documents.26 
Second, the speed at which the Internet allows documents to be dis-
persed creates additional problems.  Posting such documents on the Inter-
net, as opposed to printing them in traditional media sources such as news-
papers, allows the classified information to be viewed rapidly around the 
world without the intermediation of “judgment” by seasoned journalists 
and editors.27  Once the documents are distributed to the virtual abyss, it is 
nearly impossible to track the identity of every Internet user who has ac-
cessed the information through the use of proxies and anonymizers.28  This 
means that when a current document is leaked, enemies can use the infor-
mation immediately.29 
The Internet also makes it is impossible to retract the posted docu-
ments in the case of a mistake or problem.30  WikiLeaks does not generally 
censor its document collection, as its goal is to have viewers analyze and 
determine the truth and significance of the documents for themselves.31  
Because all documents are released,32 a document that might be borderline 
or outright top secret could be published on the website and spread around 
the world, and WikiLeaks would have no way of undoing the damage. 
As the Internet continues to expand and more websites like 
WikiLeaks begin to disseminate classified information, the line becomes 
blurred as to what information is protected under the FOIA and First 
Amendment, and what information is illegal to distribute in the name of na-
tional security.  The problem is exacerbated because WikiLeaks and its 
                                                           
25.  Morrell, supra note 21, at A9; see also Delargy, supra note 1.  
26.  Morrell, supra note 21, at A9 (“[WikiLeaks] does expose secret information that 
could make our troops even more vulnerable to attack in the future. . . .  [W]e know our enemies 
will mine this information, looking for insights into how we operate, cultivate sources and react 
in combat situations, even the capability of our equipment.  This security breach could very well 
get our troops and those they are fighting with killed.”). 
27.  See Joby Warrick, Exposing Secrets Through Secrecy; Cloaked in the Virtual 
World, Wikileaks Gives Whistleblowers A Powerful Platform, WASH. POST, May 20, 2010, at 
A01 (“There’s a difference between journalism and just putting out information.”). 
28.  See Andrew Kantor, It’s A Big Internet, but You Can Still Be Tracked Down, USA 
TODAY:  CYBERSPEAK (June 17, 2004, 7:02 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2004-06-17-kantor_x.htm. 
29.  Morrell, supra note 21, at A9. 
30.  See, e.g., Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook?  Just Try Breaking 
Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at C1 (discussing that even when a Facebook account is de-
leted, Facebook is able to keep all of the user’s information and posts). 
31.  About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3, § 1.2. 
32.  Id. 
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web servers may be outside the jurisdiction of American courts and execu-
tive agencies.33 
This Comment examines the security risks created by the rapid dis-
semination of information over the Internet as well as the protection the 
First Amendment and the FOIA provide.  Furthermore, this Comment 
will analyze the legal solutions to this vast and instantaneous interna-
tional circulation.  Part II provides a background and history of the publi-
cation of classified government documents through various media 
sources.  Part III analyzes the problems with the application of the FOIA 
and the First Amendment in the Internet age.  The arguments against limi-
tations on the FOIA and First Amendment as a means of protecting civil 
liberties are then assessed and disputed.  Part IV proposes several legal 
solutions the U.S. may implement to stop such distribution.  Finally, Part 
V concludes with the next possible step toward stopping unlawful distri-
bution of classified documents. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Right to Information Granted by  
the First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act 
Courts have sought to define the scope of the First Amendment since 
the Constitution’s inception.  There is no doubt the freedom was introduced 
as a means of abolishing the restrictions imposed by the English on free-
doms of speech and the press.34  In fact, “[t]he Government’s power to cen-
sor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to 
monitor the Government.”35  As such, the fundamental purpose of the First 
Amendment is to encourage “the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters 
of public interest and concern.”36  More specifically, “[i]n determining the 
extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not univer-
sally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent pre-
vious restraints on publication.”37  Honoring the framers’ intent, the Su-
preme Court tends to uphold First Amendment rights by frequently tipping 
                                                           
33.  Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Keep a Step Ahead of Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2010, at A8 (“WikiLeaks was directing users to Web addresses in a number of European 
countries, including Switzerland, Germany, Finland and the Netherlands.  This was WikiLeaks’s 
effort to solve the problems caused when EveryDNS.net dropped it.”). 
34.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 922 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
35.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States., 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
36.  Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
37.  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). 
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the scales in favor of protecting speech and press.38  However, these rights 
are not absolute, and the government’s interest in protecting national secu-
rity is also central to the survival of the United States, particularly in times 
of war.39 
The creation of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or “Act”) in 
1966 established another avenue to protect the people’s right to censure the 
government.40  The primary purpose of the FOIA, which generally provides 
for disclosure of agency records and information, is to open the administra-
tive processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public.41  The FOIA 
was the first law to allow Americans access to the records of government 
agencies.42  The Act is necessary, as the Supreme Court has held that there is 
no First Amendment right to access such information.43  There have been 
several revisions since the Amendment’s enactment, most conspicuously in 
1974 after the Watergate scandal.44  The scandal, which involved high-
ranking government officials, including President Richard M. Nixon, led to a 
general distrust of the government and a demand by the people that the gov-
ernment adhere to the FOIA.45  The Privacy Act Amendments46 were added 
                                                           
38.  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 767 (1986). 
39.  United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (“First 
Amendment rights are not absolute.”); see United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001); 
see also Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950) (holding that when the free-
dom of speech or press poses a clear and present danger, the right is not absolute); Near, 283 U.S. 
at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous restraint is not absolutely un-
limited,” as that right could be limited in times of war). 
40.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
41.  Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17 (1974); see also NLRB 
v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of the FOIA is to 
ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check 
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”). 
42.  History of the Freedom of Information Act, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/foia.html (last visited July 31, 2010). 
43.  Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (“‘The Constitution itself is [not] 
a Freedom of Information Act . . . .’  Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the 
government’s control.”  (citation omitted)).  See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
684–85 (1972) (“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press 
a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”). 
44.  “The Watergate scandal” refers to the incident in which President Richard M. Nixon 
and several members of his staff were caught conducting illegal activities.  They were exposed 
when members of the president’s staff were caught breaking into the Democratic National Com-
mittee’s headquarters.  As a result, the American public demanded that government agencies pro-
duce documents in hopes that the increased scrutiny would deter future scandalous behavior. 1 
WILLIAM B. DICKINSON, JR., WATERGATE:  CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS (1973). 
45.  History of the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 42.  
46.  The “Privacy Act Amendments” refers to several amendments made to the Freedom 
of Information Act in 1974 as a way to enforce the Act.  See Dan Lopez, et al., Veto Battle 30 
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to the FOIA as a means of ensuring that the government produces documents 
to avoid incidents such as Watergate.47  Since then, many additional amend-
ments have been included to guarantee the government agencies’ proper dis-
closure of documents and information.48 
In addition to amendments aiding the enforcement of the Act, there 
have also been several exemptions limiting the FOIA.  Currently, there are 
nine exemptions in place to ensure that under certain circumstances the 
government agencies are not required to release information and docu-
ments.49  Such exemptions include:  (1) when an Executive Order has been 
issued to keep the information a secret “in the interest of national defense 
or foreign policy;”50 (2) “[information] related solely to the internal per-
sonnel rules and practices of an agency;”51 and (3) “geological and geo-
physical information and data, including maps.”52  These exemptions ex-
pressly call for the limited availability of information to be available to the 
public on various issues involving national security.53  Information released 
on WikiLeaks in connection with U.S. Army operations, especially those 
like the Afghan War Diary 2004–2010 (“Afghan War Diary”), may fall un-
der one of the latter two exemptions.  Because such limitations are explic-
itly defined in the law and have been analyzed and expanded in judicial 
opinions, there appears to be room to place a lawful limit, or simply en-
force the current limit, on WikiLeaks’ continuous broad disclosure of po-
tentially classified information. 
B. Judicial and Legislative History of the Protection of National Security 
Together, the First Amendment and the FOIA create a solid founda-
tion for rights to access and publish a majority of the U.S. government’s 
                                                           
Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, Nov. 23, 2004, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm#_ednref4. 
47.  See FOIA Legislative History, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (last visited July 31, 2011); Amendments, WHAT IS 
FOIA?, http://www.whatisfoia.org/amendments1.html (last visited July 31, 2011). 
48.  See, e.g., Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996). 
49.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
50.  Id. § 552(b)(1)(A). 
51.  Id. § 552(b)(2). 
52.  Id. § 552(b)(9). 
53.  Id. § 552.  See generally Adm’r, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975) (ex-
plaining that the Act gives no intimation that all information must be disclosed.  The purpose, 
rather, is to permit access to certain official information which Congress thought had unnecessar-
ily been withheld and to protect certain information where confidentiality is necessary to protect 
legitimate governmental functions that would be impaired by disclosure.). 
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information.54  Still, the Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States55 and 
Near v. Minnesota56 recognized that government has an interest in na-
tional security57 that necessarily places limits on the information accessi-
ble to the public.  Congress codified this same interest by enacting the 
Espionage Act of 1917 (“Espionage Act”)58 and the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, also known as the U.S.A. 
P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”).59 
1. The Near Troop/Ship Exception. 
Near v. Minnesota,60 an early landmark case for the First Amendment 
freedom of the press, established, in dicta, one of the most important limita-
tions to the First Amendment.61  In that case, Near challenged a Minnesota 
statute which “provide[d] for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a ‘ma-
licious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodi-
cal.’”62  The Supreme Court held the Minnesota statute unconstitutional.63  
The Court explained, “In the first place, the main purpose of such constitu-
tional provisions is ‘to prevent all such [previous restraints] upon publica-
                                                           
54.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
55.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will 
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any con-
stitutional right.”). 
56.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war); see infra 
Part II.B.1. 
57.  See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous  
restraint is not absolutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war); Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2009) (“This section does not apply to matters 
that are . . . (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified 
pursuant to such Executive order.”). 
58.  18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006) (originally enacted as Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-
24, 40 Stat. 217). 
59.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. P.A.T.R.I.O.T.) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
60.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (finding a Minnesota law limiting freedom of press to be un-
constitutional). 
61.  Id. at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous restraint is not 
absolutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war). 
62.  Id. at 701–02 (quoting MASON’S MINN. STAT. §§ 10123-1–10123-3 (1927)). 
63.  MASON’S MINN. STAT. §§ 10123-1–10123-3 (1927) (invalidated by Near, 283 U.S. at 
722–23).  
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tions as had been practiced by other governments.’”64  Thus, the Constitu-
tion necessarily requires a heavy burden to show justification for the re-
straint,65 and any limitation on the freedom of the press must be subject to 
strict scrutiny.66 
Despite ruling in favor of the press, the Court outlined an exception to 
the First Amendment’s protection in its discussion.67  In the midst of a 
lengthy argument against the Minnesota law, the Court provided that “the 
protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.”68  The 
Court expanded on this point by recognizing that the limitation shall only 
be recognized in “exceptional cases.”69  “Exceptional cases” specifically 
referred to the following: 
“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time 
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance 
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”  No one 
would question but that a government might prevent actual ob-
struction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing 
dates of transports or the number and location of troops.70 
The Court thus clearly outlined an exception to the First Amendment 
during times of war71 by distinguishing war as a specific time when the 
First Amendment and its protections may be limited.72 
The Court’s finding that specific details of military operations need 
not be published is relevant to the present case involving WikiLeaks.73  
This constraint classifies a type of information not always protected by the 
                                                           
64.  Near, 283 U.S. at 714 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (em-
phasis omitted)). 
65.  United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2005).  See generally Near, 
283 U.S. at 714–15 (stating that the chief purpose of freedom of the press is to prevent prior re-
straints on publication); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (stating that the 
imposition of a prior restraint carries a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”).  
66.  See generally Near, 283 U.S. at 714–15 (stating that the chief purpose of freedom of 
the press is to prevent prior restraints on publication); Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 70. 
67.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id.  
70.  Id. (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH 10 (1920)). 
71.  Id.  (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous restraint is not abso-
lutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (stating that the right of the press to be free from “previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited,” as that right could be limited in times of war). 
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First Amendment.  Specifically, the exception sets apart military informa-
tion as a specific category of speech or publication that is more likely to 
meet the strict scrutiny standard that governs content-based restrictions on 
the First Amendment.74  This exception is evidence of the Court’s firm in-
terest in national security. 
2. The Espionage Act. 
The Espionage Act, passed into law shortly after the United States en-
tered World War I,75 made it a crime to disclose or distribute information 
that would hinder the operations or success of U.S. military forces or, alter-
natively, abet the success of U.S. enemies.76  Though the Act had the sup-
port of President Woodrow Wilson, many people felt—even against the 
backdrop of fear of a worldwide German takeover—that such a law was 
unconstitutional.77  The law sparked an ongoing congressional debate over 
the boundaries of First Amendment rights when juxtaposed with national 
security.78  First, there were concerns that the statutory text was vague and 
could be construed too broadly, thereby granting too much power to both 
the Department of Justice and the War Department.79  Proponents of civil 
liberties were also apprehensive of the Act’s infringement on U.S. citizens’ 
First Amendment rights.80  Even though Schenck v. United States upheld 
the Act in 1919,81 several courts have since raised concerns about its con-
                                                           
74.  Id. 
75.  See 18 U.S.C. § 793 (originally enacted as Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 
40 Stat. 217); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of 
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 939–42 (1973) (providing an overview of the leg-
islative history of the Espionage Act from its inception to the present law). 
76.  18 U.S.C. § 793 (originally enacted as Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 
Stat. 217). 
77.  Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 75, at 939–42 (providing an overview of the legislative 
history of the Espionage Act from its inception to the present law). 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (upholding the criminal conviction of a defendant who be-
lieved he was exercising his First Amendment rights when speaking out against the draft during 
World War I).  A defendant’s criminal conviction was deemed Constitutional under the new 
“clear and present danger” test; the Court held that “[t]he question in every case is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and pre-
sent danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”  
Id.  The Court then elaborated, “When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of 
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”  Id.  In 
amending the FOIA to include limitations on information pertaining to national security, the leg-
islature followed the Court in Schenck, thereby affirming the necessity for such a limitation.  See 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
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stitutionality.  The law has never been explicitly overturned, but it was ex-
amined and questioned in New York Times Co. v. United States82 and 
United States v. Progressive, Inc.83 
Despite the contentious nature of the law, its “inartful language” was 
later transferred to the U.S. Code and remains current law.84  The Espio-
nage Act is now codified in 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e) and was the source 
of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).85  Today, the law still calls for criminal punishment 
of individuals who violate the modern Espionage Act by a fine or up to ten 
years in prison.86  Subsections (d) and (e) provide that a person who pos-
sesses information regarding U.S. national defense that could injure the 
United States or promote the advantage of a foreign nation87 and who “will-
fully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, de-
livered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or 
cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person 
not entitled to receive it,”88 shall be deemed in violation of the law.89  The 
two subsections are distinct in that subsection (d) refers to individuals who 
possess the information lawfully,90 while subsection (e) refers to individu-
als who possess the information unlawfully.91 
The modern Espionage Act remains a viable means of prosecuting in-
dividuals for the transmission of unlawful information, and the Supreme 
Court has not made any recent rulings regarding its constitutionality or ap-
plication.92  Though the Court has not examined subsections (d) and (e) ex-
clusively,93 the Act in its entirety has withstood numerous challenges for 
vagueness and overbreadth.94  This firm history indicates the law is “perti-
                                                           
82.  See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713; see infra Part III.B.1. 
83.  See Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 1000 (issuing a temporary injunction against Pro-
gressive to halt the publication of an article revealing secret information about the atomic bomb). 
84.  Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 75, at 939. 
85.  Id. at 939–42 (providing an overview of the legislative history of the Espionage Act 
from its inception to the present law). 
86.  18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(f). 
87.  Id. § 793(d)–(e). 
88.  Id. § 793(d)–(e). 
89.  Id. § 793(d)–(e). 
90.  Id. § 793(d). 
91.  Id. § 793(e). 
92.  See generally United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 (E.D. Va. 2006) (find-
ing that the litigation history of 18 U.S.C. § 793 is sparse). 
93.  Id.  (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e) have not yet been considered by the Su-
preme Court). 
94.  See, e.g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941); United States v. Morison, 844 
F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).  See generally Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (stating that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 793(d) and (e) have not yet been considered by the Supreme Court). 
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nent and instructive.”95 
The criminal sanctions within the Espionage Act are important in pre-
venting U.S. citizens, such as Private First Class Bradley Manning,96 and 
non-citizens, such as WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, from distributing 
classified government information to various sources.  However, these laws 
are in need of additional support to counter the rise of cyber-warfare.97  The 
punishments asserted in the Espionage Act, such as incarceration and fines, 
may be unable stop the spread of this information by entities masked as 
websites.  Part IV of this Comment proposes additional solutions for com-
bating such cyber-warfare and document leaks. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. The “Near Troop/Ship Exception” Applies to WikiLeaks 
Although WikiLeaks illuminates several modern problems with dis-
closing classified government documents through a media avenue, the lim-
its on freedom of speech to benefit national security have been litigated be-
fore, and therefore the problem is not entirely without precedent.98  The 
dicta in the Near decision explicates that the First Amendment may be lim-
ited in times of war, particularly with regard to the publication of informa-
tion concerning military operations.99  Though the Court ultimately held in 
                                                           
95.  See, e.g., Gorin, 312 U.S. 19; Morison, 844 F.2d 1057.  See generally Rosen, 445 F. 
Supp. 2d at 613 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e) have not yet been considered by the Su-
preme Court). 
96.  See supra Part I. 
97.  “Cyber-terrorism” is “[a] criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and tele-
communications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services to 
create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influ-
encing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social, or ideological 
agenda.”  See Cyber-terrorism Definition, U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, 
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE—THREATS, DCSINT HANDBOOK NO. 
1.02—CYBER OPERATIONS AND CYBER TERRORISM GLOSSARY-1 (2005). 
98.  See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (finding limitations on the 
freedom of the press justified when a clear and present danger exists); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (holding leaflets intending to promote violence were not protected by 
the First Amendment); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that the right of the 
press to be free from prior restraints is not absolutely unlimited, as that right could be limited in 
times of war, but ultimately holding the publication lawful under the First Amendment); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–50 (1969) (holding the government may not prohibit or pun-
ish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to incite violence or imminent lawless action); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding the government did not meet its 
heavy burden to justify a prior restraint on the publication of classified documents from the Viet-
nam War). 
99.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (stating the right to prior restraints of the press is not absolutely 
unlimited, and should be recognized particularly during times of war); see supra Part II.A. 
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favor of the press, this limitation left room for national security as a com-
pelling government interest.100  There is no doubt the Court has been care-
ful to implement the national security limitation on the First Amend-
ment;101 however, the Near exception should apply to WikiLeaks’s 
dissemination of various documents from both the War in Afghanistan and 
the War in Iraq.102 
First, it is presently a time of war.103  While the current “War on Ter-
ror” has not been formally declared by Congress, it caused the deployment 
of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq.104  Specifically, Congress authorized the 
War in Afghanistan despite a formal declaration of war.105  In addition, the 
Iraq War was authorized by Congress and the United Nations Security 
Council,106 and Congress passed legislation providing significant funds and 
troops to support the war effort.107  Although Congress rarely formally de-
clares war,108 the president is nevertheless able to conduct a war without a 
formal declaration.109  Many modern conflicts, which have posed signifi-
cant threats to the United States’ national security, have gone undeclared.110  
Additionally, the government rarely declares formal war, since “war” is not 
a public-relations friendly term.111  For purposes of applying the Near ex-
ception, these “conflicts” are still extreme financial and military invest-
                                                           
100.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
101.  Id. (“[T]he limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases . . . .”). 
102.  See supra Part I. 
103.  President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Regarding the September 11, 2001 
Attacks (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-
20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US) (coining the term 
“War on Terror”). 
104.  Id.  (coining the term “War on Terror”). 
105.  Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 498 (2002); see Lieut. General Greg Newbold, Why Iraq Was a Mistake, 
TIME, Apr. 17, 2006, at 42.   
106.  Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. 
107.  Id. 
108.  See John Dean, FindLaw Forum:  President Needs Congressional Approval to De-
clare War on Iraq, CNN (Aug. 30, 2002,12:12 PM) 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/columns/fl.dean.warpowers/ (“In the almost 30 years since 
Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution, presidents have regularly employed our Armed 
Forces in hostilities without consulting with Congress.”); Major John L. Beacon, THE 
DECLARATION OF WAR:  ONE FOR THE HISTORY BOOKS, (1991) (unpublished seminar paper, 
National Defense University) available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/BJL.htm (“The declaration of war . . . 
is, in reality, a seldom used concept . . . .”).  
109.  Editorial, Who Can Declare War?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, at 26. 
110.  See id. 
111.  See Norman Soloman, War Needs Good Public Relations, FAIR (Oct. 25, 2001), 
http://www.fair.org/media-beat/011025.html.  
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ments for the government, and it is thereby presumable that as investments, 
the United States’ interest in national security extends to undeclared wars. 
Assuming it is presently a time of war, the Near analysis should be 
applied.  As the Court in Near held, times of war are distinct from times of 
peace.112  The WikiLeaks controversy stemmed from a leak of documents 
regarding the War in Afghanistan.113  By its nature, wartime means clear 
and present dangers are more likely to exist.114  For example, the release of 
documents regarding an army base during a time of peace presents very lit-
tle danger,115 whereas during a time of war the same information may pro-
vide the enemy an opportunity to endanger the lives of soldiers on the 
base.116  Moreover, in leaking extensive and detailed documents regarding 
the War in Afghanistan, WikiLeaks calls to mind the “hindrance” to the na-
tion’s effort to which the dicta in Near117 alluded and which the Schenck 
decision described in detail.118  The Court’s unwavering distinction be-
tween times of war and times of peace is important in understanding how 
some of WikiLeaks’ posts may, in fact, be illegal.119 
Though to classify the present state of affairs at a time of war is im-
portant in analyzing the effect of the leaked information, the WikiLeaks 
disclosures are mainly unlawful in their content.  According to Near, al-
though the First Amendment might protect the disclosure of specific de-
tails of military positioning, strategies, and tactics, the government may 
justify a prior restraint on the publication of such information if it satis-
fies strict scrutiny.120 
                                                           
112.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in 
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”  (quoting 
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52)). 
113.  See supra Part I. 
114.  See supra Part II.B.2, note 83.  See generally Schenck, 249 U.S. 47. 
115.  But see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 839 (1976) (holding constitutional tradi-
tion supports the notions that the military is free to be insulated from partisan political campaigns 
and that “[t]he guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant ‘that people who want to 
propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and 
wherever they please.’” (quoting Adderley v. Fla., 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966))). 
116.  See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“But the character of every act depends upon the cir-
cumstances in which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a 
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). 
117.  Near, 283 U.S. at 697. 
118.  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
119.  Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in 
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” (quoting 
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52)). 
120.  Id.  (“No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction 
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and lo-
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All content-based restrictions of the First Amendment are subject to 
strict scrutiny,121 and the WikiLeaks disclosures are no exception.  This 
heightened scrutiny aims to preserve the original intent of the First 
Amendment,122 protecting freedom of speech as a method to censure the 
government,123 thereby fostering democracy.124  To satisfy the strict scru-
tiny standard, the restriction or law must be:  (1) justified by a compelling 
state interest; (2) narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) the least 
restrictive way of achieving that interest.125  A restriction on the WikiLeaks 
disclosures would meet this high standard of review. 
First and foremost, the government has a compelling interest to re-
strict classified military information during a time of war.126  As mentioned 
previously, the Supreme Court has stated that the protection of troops and 
war strategies justifies a First Amendment limitation.127  In the present 
case, the Department of Defense and the Pentagon, as well as other gov-
ernment agencies and officials, notified WikiLeaks and other media 
sources that the release of classified documents regarding the wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq endangers troops and exposes war strategies to enemies 
of the United States.128  The agencies and individuals have concurred that 
the release of U.S. soldiers’ names and locations may put troops at further 
risk.129  As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing, it is an inappro-
priate time to release information that may result in harm. 
Conversely, there is general public concern that the current wars are 
                                                           
cations of troops.”). 
121.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) (holding content-based 
restrictions on the First Amendment to be subject to strict scrutiny). 
122.  See Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding the 
First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of sub-
ject matter or content); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680. 
123.  See generally N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 716.  
124.  See generally id. at 717. 
125.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
126.  See Near,  283 U.S. at 716 (“No one would question but that a government might 
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops.”); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (approving limitations on 
the freedom of the press when a clear and present danger exists). 
127.  See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (“No one would question but that a government might 
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops.”); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (approving limitations on 
the freedom of the press when a clear and present danger exists). 
128.  Morrell, supra note 21, at A9 (“[W]e know our enemies will mine this information, 
looking for insights into how we operate, cultivate sources and react in combat situations, even 
the capability of our equipment.  This security breach could very well get our troops and those 
they are fighting with killed.”). 
129.  Id.  (“By disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks continues to put at risk 
the lives of our troops, their coalition partners and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us.”). 
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unnecessary and resulted in the unwarranted loss of troops and taxpayer 
dollars.130  Individuals and organizations that support the release of such 
information via WikiLeaks and other similar media contend that the public 
deserves to know what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan.131  There is 
no doubt the public deserves to know details of the war, and the Supreme 
Court has confirmed this notion.132  At some point, however, the informa-
tion being dispersed to the public must be limited.  For instance, the public 
should not know the names and locations of troops, facts that were leaked 
in the Afghan War Diary 2004─2010 (“Afghan War Diary”).133  The de-
tails disclosed provided the public with little information on the general 
war efforts and costs, the primary concern of opponents,134 but instead 
compromised soldiers’ lives and the U.S. war efforts.135  The government’s 
desires to protect U.S. troops and to end the wars quickly are compelling 
government interests.136  If and when a formal restriction is issued to stop 
WikiLeaks from disseminating classified U.S. military documents, the re-
striction must be narrowly tailored and must use the least restrictive means 
possible to maintain this compelling government interest.137 
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requires the disclosure of 
all government documents,138 including U.S. military documents.139  How-
ever, the FOIA has a specific exception for information concerning an 
agency’s operation and for Executive Orders regarding national security.140  
                                                           
130.  See, e.g., R.M., Eight Questions for Daniel Ellsberg, THE ECONOMIST DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA BLOG (July 31, 2010, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/07/daniel_ellsberg_interview. 
131.  See, e.g., id. 
132.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (holding that the government did not meet its bur-
den to justify a prior restraint on publication of classified documents from the Vietnam War). 
133.  Gates:  Posting Classified War Documents Was Morally Wrong, supra note 23. 
134.  See generally, R.M., supra note 130.  
135.  Morrell, supra note 21, at A9 (“[W]e know our enemies will mine this information, 
looking for insights into how we operate, cultivate sources and react in combat situations, even 
the capability of our equipment.  This security breach could very well get our troops and those 
they are fighting with killed.”).  
136.  Id.  (“By disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks continues to put at risk 
the lives of our troops, their coalition partners and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us.”). 
137.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680 (holding that content-based restrictions on 
the First Amendment are subject to strict scrutiny); see also Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 
152–53 n.4 (establishing the test for strict scrutiny). 
138.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
139.  Id. § 552(f)(1). 
140.  Id. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B) (“This section does not apply to matters that are . . . specifi-
cally authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest 
of national defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Ex-
ecutive order . . . .”). 
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Thus, the Near exception141 does not conflict with the FOIA’s mandate to 
disclose government documents.142  In releasing the documents provided by 
Private First Class Bradley Manning regarding the day-to-day account of 
the War created by military officials in the course of duty, WikiLeaks vio-
lated the Near Troop/Ship Exception.143 
B. The Effect of WikiLeaks is More Detrimental than that of  
the Pentagon Papers 
1. Background of the Pentagon Papers Case 
Arguably the most famous contest between national security consid-
erations and the First Amendment occurred in 1971 with the release of the 
Pentagon Papers,144 the government’s classified, extensive study regarding 
the Vietnam War.  The New York Times and the Washington Post sought to 
publish the study but the government attempted to have them enjoined from 
doing so.145  The Supreme Court overturned the injunction the District 
Court granted in the New York Times case,146 and refused to reverse a dif-
ferent District Court’s denial of an injunction in the Washington Post 
case.147  The Supreme Court held that the government did not meet the 
heavy burden required for the imposition of such a restraint.148  In stark 
contrast to its opinion in Schenck, in which the Court established that clear 
and present dangers justify a limitation on the freedom of speech and 
press,149 the Court in New York Times upheld the principles of the First 
Amendment despite the ongoing state of the Vietnam War.150 
Invoking the First Amendment in its broadest capacity, several jus-
tices looked to the Framers’ intent to safeguard basic freedoms151 as well as 
the necessity for transparency in a democracy.152  Justice Black elaborated 
                                                           
141.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
142.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
143.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
144.  DEP’T OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945–1967 (1971). 
145.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. 
146.  United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated, N.Y. Times 
Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
147.  United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (C.A.D.C. 1971), vacated, N.Y. 
Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
148.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. 
149.  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (approving limitations on the freedom of the press when a 
clear and present danger exists). 
150.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (holding the government did not meet its heavy burden 
to justify a prior restraint on the publication of classified documents from the Vietnam War). 
151.  Id. at 715. 
152.  Id. at 724. 
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on the superiority of the First Amendment, generally finding the content of 
the documents to be immaterial.153  Justice Douglas, concurring with Jus-
tice Black, asserted that the First Amendment, specifically the liberty of the 
press, served as an important check on the government.154  Justices Stewart 
and White argued to the contrary that in areas of national defense, the 
President is given great deference to protect information as needed;155 how-
ever, both Justices agreed: 
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present 
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint 
upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense 
and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in 
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here 
protect the values of democratic government.  For this reason, it 
is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vi-
tally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment.  For 
without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlight-
ened people.156 
Though the minority cited national security concerns, the Court 
largely upheld the notion that an informed citizenry is an essential check on 
executive power in foreign affairs.157 
2. Distinctions Between the Current Wars and the Vietnam War 
The Court in New York Times Co. v. United States accurately inter-
preted the First Amendment’s guarantees for the freedom of the press, even 
during a time of a war.158  Though there are many parallels, the documents 
posted on WikiLeaks are distinct from the Pentagon Papers for many rea-
sons.159  First, the nature of the War in Afghanistan and the greater “War on 
Terror”160 is different from the Vietnam War.  The U.S. entered into the 
                                                           
153.  Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It should be noted at the outset that the First 
Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.’  That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press.” (citing U.S. 
CONST. amend. I)). 
154.  Id. at 720–24 (Black, J., concurring). 
155.  Id. at 727–40 (Stewart, J. & White, J., concurring). 
156.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J. & White, J., concurring). 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. at 714 (holding that the government did not meet its heavy burden to justify a 
prior restraint on the publication of classified documents from the Vietnam War). 
159.  Paul Farhi & Ellen Nakashima, The Pentagon Papers, Part 2?  Parallels, and Dif-
ferences, Exist, WASH. POST, July 27, 2010, at C1. 
160.  Bush, supra note 103 (coining the term “War on Terror” after the September 11, 
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Vietnam War, despite a military policy to fight only defensive wars, as part 
of a greater containment policy and to prevent communism from spreading 
to South Vietnam.161  The Vietnam War was mainly prompted by fear of 
the spread of communism.162  The War in Afghanistan, in contrast, was a 
direct response to the attacks by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001,163 which 
occurred on U.S. soil and resulted in 2,996 casualties164—the majority of 
whom were civilians.165  The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan was a 
means of stopping terrorist threats and attacks throughout the world follow-
ing the September 11, 2001 attacks.166  As evidenced by continuing attacks 
by groups such as al-Qaeda, the threats to the U.S. in the current “War on 
Terror” are legitimate, and there is not the same need to expose the details 
of the war.167  During the Vietnam War, U.S. citizens felt left in the dark 
while the government acted in an improper manner by concealing vast 
amounts of information from the American public.168  The Pentagon Pa-
                                                           
2001 attacks on the United States). 
161.  See Presidential News Conference of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Apr. 7, 1954) (tran-
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decade).  See generally President Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress 
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lating the containment policy, which required the United States to react to Soviet initiatives and 
gave the President greater military power in order to respond quickly to crises).   
162.  Denise M. Bostdorff & Steven R. Goldzwig, Idealism and Pragmatism in American 
Foreign Policy Rhetoric:  The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam, 24 PRES. STUD. Q. 515, 
516 (1994) (describing President John F. Kennedy’s policies with regard to Vietnam and commu-
nism). 
163.  On September 11, 2001, two U.S. commercial airplanes were hijacked by al-Qaeda 
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vania field.  These attacks were the first on the U.S. mainland since the Civil War.  The incident 
instilled fear in many Americans and initiated an international “War on Terror.”  See generally 
September 11:  Chronology of Terror, CNN (Sept. 12, 2001), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/. 
164.  Dale Challener Roe, What is 2996?, PROJECT 2,996, 
http://project2996.wordpress.com/what-is-2996/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2011) (describing Project 
2996 as a tribute to the 2996 victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
165.  Accord THE UNOFFICIAL HOMEPAGE OF FDNY, http://nyfd.com/9_11_wtc.html 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2010); see We Remember . . . , PROJECT 2,996, 
http://project2996.wordpress.com/we-remember (last visited Aug. 6, 2011) (listing each victim of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
166.  President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), avail-
able at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. 
167.  See Homeland Security Advisory System, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm (last visited Nov. 20, 
2010) (relaying the U.S. government’s current national threat level). 
168.  See generally Martin Arnold, Pentagon Papers Charges Are Dismissed; Judge 
Byrne Frees Ellsberg and Russo, Assails “Improper Government Conduct”, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 
(May 12, 1973) (reporting on the judge’s dismissal of the Pentagon Papers trial based on what he 
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pers169 allowed the nation to see exactly what was happening in Vietnam; 
they “revealed a ‘credibility gap’ between the Johnson administration’s 
public statements and its private actions.”170  Supporters argue that the re-
cent WikiLeaks disclosures function as the Pentagon Papers did in the 
1970s by exposing the U.S. government’s deception.171  As a result of 
modern technology, this is not the case. 
Today, live broadcasts of American soldiers around the world, Face-
book172 updates, video chats with soldiers abroad, and other media sources 
are able to show U.S. civilians what is actually happening in the “War on 
Terror.”173  These new media sources affect a heightened public awareness 
about the war, particularly in comparison to the Cold War and Vietnam 
War eras.174  Soldiers are now able to broadcast their experiences and frus-
trations from overseas without publishing thousands of documents.175  Ad-
ditionally, figures about the war, including the total number of deaths and 
the amount of money spent, are readily available on the Internet.176  With 
such information readily accessible, the argument that the public is in the 
dark is less persuasive than in prior decades. 
A further distinction between the “War on Terror” and the Vietnam 
War is if the U.S. government has been concealing current war information 
from the nation, the fact that the information was disseminated over the In-
ternet may render the leaks far more detrimental than the publication of 
similar information by a newspaper.177  Depending on who is running the 
website, online content such as WikiLeaks may be irreversible.178  Even if a 
                                                           
called “improper Government conduct shielded so long from public view . . . .”). 
169.  H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS, 1945–1967:  
STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Comm. Print 1971). 
170.  Farhi & Nakashima, supra note 159, at C1. 
171.  See id. 
172.  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Aug. 6, 2011) (existing as a so-
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173.  See, e.g., rainsong14, US Soldier Speaks Out Against The War in Iraq 1 of 3, 
YOUTUBE (May 31, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuCIiIig0Do; see also Afghani-
stan:  Key Facts and Figures, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8143196.stm. 
174.  See Eric Blair, WikiLeaks Being Used to Justify “Patriot Act” Legislation for Inter-
net, THE INTEL HUB, http://theintelhub.com/2010/12/07/breaking-wikileaks-being-used-to-
justify-patriot-act-legislation-for-internet/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (indicating that anything 
leaked by WikiLeaks was not new news to today’s Internet savvy public). 
175.  See, e.g., rainsong14, supra note 173.  
176.  See, e.g., Afghanistan:  Key Facts and Figures, supra note 173.  
177.  See generally Aspan, supra note 30 (discussing the permanence of information dis-
seminated on the Internet via Facebook). 
178.  See, e.g., id. (discussing that even when a Facebook account is deleted, Facebook is 
able to keep all of the user’s information and posts). 
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website is removed, the information may have already been downloaded or 
remain on a corporate server or may have been moved to a mirror website, 
thus allowing the content to continue spreading.179 
3. The Content of the Leaks and the Pentagon Papers 
Even assuming the medium of current leaks over the Internet is not 
substantially different from the print medium of newspapers, the content of 
WikiLeaks is nonetheless vastly different from the material in the Pentagon 
Papers.180  The Pentagon Papers “disclosed official secrets, such as the 
covert bombing of Laos and Cambodia, and outright lies, such as Lyndon 
Johnson’s plans to widen the war in 1964 despite an explicit campaign 
pledge to the contrary.”181  Conversely, the WikiLeaks documents have not 
revealed the same kind of hidden agenda from either the Bush or Obama 
Administration.182  It was clear that even though many people opposed 
President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq and Afghanistan, his agenda was 
to end terrorism.183  With this mission in mind, “the Afghan documents 
don’t specifically contradict official statements and administration policies, 
as the Pentagon Papers did.”184 
Additionally, the leaks differ in that the Pentagon Papers painted a 
quite different picture from what news reports had been portraying;185 con-
versely, the WikiLeaks documents “are a loosely related collection of mate-
rial covering nearly six years (early 2004 through late 2009) that leaves out 
important context,”186 thus adding very little to most Americans’ notions of 
the war.187  Since the documents include after-action summaries and details 
described in raw material without context,188 the leaks actually deceive the 
American public rather than shed light on a controversial situation.  An ar-
gument may be made that the recent release of diplomatic cables by 
                                                           
179.  See generally id. (discussing the permanence of information disseminated on the 
Internet via Facebook). 
180.  Farhi & Nakashima, supra note 159.  
181.  Id. 
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WikiLeaks illuminated how certain diplomats felt about other countries, 
but these statements were not new information.189  Since the start of the 
“War on Terror,” many countries have declared public opposition to the 
U.S. stance, and releasing the cables may embarrass or isolate important 
allies, stirring further controversy with foreign nations.190  Furthermore, the 
cables have exposed nations acting in contravention to their asserted posi-
tions on certain foreign policies, causing obvious tension between tradi-
tional allies.191  Even though the cables do not present the direct threats that 
the information in the Afghan War Diary and Iraq leaks contained, the re-
lease of such information may be detrimental to U.S. foreign relations.192  
In the case of the Pentagon Papers, foreign relations were not at issue, and 
the goal was to expose U.S. deception rather than embarrass public offi-
cials.  For these reasons, the Pentagon Papers and the WikiLeaks docu-
ments are fundamentally different. 
4. Leakers Are Distinct from Classic Journalists 
Journalists and “leakers” are also distinct from one another.  A jour-
nalist takes time to research the facts of his or her article prior to publica-
tion.193  Moreover, when publishing a controversial document in a newspa-
per, there is usually time for the government to stop the document’s 
release, or at least halt its release temporarily as was true in the case of the 
Pentagon Papers.194  The newspaper publication process also allows one or 
more editors to evaluate prospective articles and controversial publica-
tions.195  Although the news media inherently supports First Amendment 
rights, the process is structured, deliberate and lawful.196  The New York 
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Times remained consistent in its goal not to harm national security interests 
when it decided not to publish certain documents.197  Though it described 
the documents in some detail,198 it did not disclose the names and locations 
of soldiers, which is a primary issue in the present case against 
WikiLeaks.199  Perhaps this is an indication that such documents fall within 
the unlawful distribution of classified information and outside the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, as a reputable news source such as the New 
York Times would certainly want to publish notable documents about the 
war if they were truthful, honest, and controversial. 
5. The WikiLeaks Documents Lack Proper Authenticity 
As part of its goal of exposing various governments, WikiLeaks has 
amended its authentication process to allow the average person to legally 
post documents.200  WikiLeaks originally stated it would not authenticate 
sources, as the “best way to truly determine if a story is authentic, is not 
just our expertise, but to provide the full source document to the broader 
community—and particularly the community of interest around the docu-
ment.”201  However, now WikiLeaks asserts that the site uses a detailed 
procedure along with skilled journalists to authenticate documents before 
they are released.202  The website currently states: 
We use traditional investigative journalism techniques as well as 
more modern [technology-based] methods.  Typically we will do 
a forensic analysis of the document, determine the cost of for-
gery, means, motive, opportunity, the claims of the apparent 
authoring organization, [sic] and answer a set of other detailed 
questions about the document.  We may also seek external veri-
fication of the document . . . .203 
It is unclear which of the two processes is the website’s true authenti-
cation policy; however, it is clear that the authentication process is con-
ducted by WikiLeaks “journalists” and not by the agencies or corporations 
                                                           
197.  Id. 
198.  Secret Dispatches from the War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/iraq-war-logs.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2011). 
199.  Vanden Brook, supra note 21.  
200.  About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3, § 1.2. 
201.  WikiLeaks:  About (Translation), WIKILEAKS, 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/wiki/About_Wikileaks (last visited Aug. 6, 2011) (translating a previous 
“WikiLeaks:  About” text).  
202.  About:  What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 3, § 1.4. 
203.  Id. 
  
2011] WIKILEAKS: NATIONAL SECURITY VS. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 261 
by which they are created. 
Additionally, documents disseminated by WikiLeaks are never cen-
sored or scrutinized before posting.204  WikiLeaks’ goal in posting all 
documents as an effort to encourage the public to analyze primary sources 
is very different from the New York Times’ desire to publish an in-depth 
look at the Vietnam War via the Pentagon Papers.  The publication of the 
Pentagon Papers was an effort to expose the war and was conducted in an 
objectively lawful manner as determined by the United States Supreme 
Court,205 whereas the posting of the Afghan War Diary on WikiLeaks is 
likely an illegal posting of a mixture of lawful and unlawful documents.206 
In failing to authenticate or censor the documents properly,207 a naïve 
Internet user viewing the WikiLeaks documents may read false information 
about the war, assume it to be true, and begin to take action.  The First 
Amendment was undoubtedly established to protect public criticism of the 
government and its actions;208 however, speaking falsely has not been con-
stitutionally tolerated, particularly when it may lead to a clear and present 
danger.209  In this case, speaking out falsely against the war may upset mili-
tary morale or lead to a general misunderstanding of the war.  It could even 
lead the public to vote an alternative way on certain issues, such as federal 
spending, than it would otherwise be inclined to do if the true facts were 
illuminated.  For all of these reasons, the WikiLeaks case should not be ex-
amined and analyzed in the same light as the Pentagon Papers, and a leak 
should be restricted from publication in part or in its entirety. 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO STOP VIOLATIONS BY  
WEBSITES SUCH AS WIKILEAKS 
Assuming the government is able to obtain an injunction to stop the 
disclosure of military documents, there are several problems in enjoining a 
site such as WikiLeaks.  Primarily, WikiLeaks is run by the Swedish-based 
company PRQ, whose central server is in Stockholm, Sweden.210  Addi-
tionally, as a result of recent cyberattacks, the site is no longer registered 
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under the .org domain and now instead has several mirror sites that are run 
by other domains such as .ch.211  Since the Swedish-based, Czech-
domained website lies outside U.S. jurisdiction, WikiLeaks would have no 
incentive to follow an injunction even if one were issued.212  Consequently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has no way of enforcing an injunction against the 
website to stop the dissemination of classified war documents.213  In order 
to stop such leaks, the government must turn to alternative solutions to en-
join the sites from mass distribution. 
A. Legislative Solution:  Revise the Espionage Act 
A revision to the language of the Espionage Act of 1917 (“Espio-
nage Act”)214 would be the most effective way to stop and/or punish leak-
ers.  While the Freedom of Information Act (“Act” or “FOIA”) could be 
revised to place extra limitations on what information should be provided 
to the public, its revision would not likely affect the dissemination of in-
formation over websites such as WikiLeaks.215  The Espionage Act is ar-
guably the best way to prosecute leakers.216  If Julian Assange is deliv-
ered to U.S. authorities, it is thought that he would also be prosecuted 
under the Espionage Act.217  As discussed above, the Act holds distribu-
tors of information pertaining to national defense criminally liable for 
their actions.218  While this provision would allow for the prosecution of 
those who supplied the information to WikiLeaks, “prosecutors . . . have 
never successfully prosecuted recipients of leaked information for passing 
it on to others—an activity that can fall under the First Amendment’s 
strong protections of speech and press freedoms.”219  If a case cannot be 
made for Mr. Assange’s aid in extracting the documents, it will be nearly 
impossible to prosecute him under the Act.220  Therefore, the language 
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must be changed to include distributors. 
Senator Joseph Lieberman recently initiated a proposed change to 
the Espionage Act called the SHIELD Act (Securing Human Intelligence 
and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act).221  The goal of the Act is to 
“make it a crime for any person knowingly and willfully to disseminate, 
‘in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States,’ 
any classified information ‘concerning the human intelligence activities 
of the United States.’”222  While this change is the most effective way to 
prosecute classified document distributors such as Julian Assange, it is 
likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment.223  Banning the dis-
semination of any classified information would “risk too great a sacrifice 
of public deliberation.”224 
However, Senator Lieberman’s proposed change to the Espionage 
Act, adding a clause indicating that such prosecution could only take place 
if there was a “clear and present danger,” may avoid this risk.225  This addi-
tion would use the Court’s language to limit the application of the law to 
times of war.226  A broader definition of “times of war,” as discussed 
above, would allow for the prosecution of individuals such as Mr. Assange 
without compromising First Amendment protection.227 
Perhaps another option is only to prosecute the disseminator if the 
source is not disclosed.  This alternative would deter people from exposing 
classified information because it would eliminate the anonymity of 
WikiLeaks.  Additionally, codified language that would allow for the 
prosecution of distributors of unauthentic or diplomatic opinions would al-
low non-fact based opinions, such as the ones in the recent diplomatic cable 
leaks, to be banned on their face.228  These types of documents do not fall 
under information necessary to the public under the FOIA, and therefore 
are not necessary or relevant to one’s ability to effectively censure the gov-
ernment.229  These revisions would be an effective deterrent for third party 
distributors such as Mr. Assange, thus incentivizing individuals to seek 
government approval prior to disseminating classified information.230  As-
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suming this solution stops “leaks” from occurring in the first place, addi-
tional technical solutions, discussed below, would be necessary to remove 
the material. 
B. Technical Solutions:  Cyber-Warfare 
An alternative to terminating WikiLeaks is through cyber-warfare.231  
Using advanced hacking technology, the government would terminate the 
WikiLeaks site making its contents inaccessible.232  In fact, Marc Thiessen, 
a renowned author and a former member of White House Senior Staff,233 
recently confirmed, “[t]he United States has the cyber capabilities to pre-
vent WikiLeaks from disseminating those materials.”234  Furthermore, 
“[t]he Pentagon probably has the ability to launch distributed denial-of-
service attacks against WikiLeaks’ public-facing servers.”235  Using this 
method, the government could stop future leaks by shutting down the web-
site and removing any questionable content that currently exists within the 
domain name.236  Cyber-warfare effectively addresses the immediacy re-
quired to stop the instantaneous mass dissemination of information. 
While efficient, the cyber-warfare solution poses problems with pub-
lic perception.237  The government may move past this obstacle by hiring 
an unofficial third party individual to take down the website on its be-
half,238 but this solution would come at a price to that individual—most 
likely, a prison sentence.  Hence, while many see cyber-warfare as an op-
timal solution, it cannot operate without extreme distaste by many citizens 
and public organizations that view it as unacceptable censorship. 
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C. International Treaty 
A diplomatic solution in the form of an international treaty, either on 
its own or concurrently with the prosecution of leakers under the Espionage 
Act, could stop the dissemination of classified government information 
from any country without permission.  An international treaty may provide 
the collaborative effort necessary to prevent the leak of classified informa-
tion by establishing an avenue to prosecute in international court leakers 
who operate out of other countries.239  The treaty could be under the super-
vision of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).240  The IGF was mandated 
by the World Summit on the Information Society (“WSIS”),241 and adopted 
formally by the United Nations (“UN”) in 2006.242  The IGF’s purpose is to 
provide a forum for dialogue on Internet policy issues.243  At the 2009 
meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, participants in the Security, Openness 
and Privacy session discussed the need for more policies on Internet secu-
rity.244  These specific policies have yet to be drafted or put in place by the 
IGF.245  At the most recent IGF summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, the European 
Union proposed an international treaty that identifies “12 ‘principles of in-
ternet governance.’”246 The proposed treaty encourages “cross-border co-
operation between countries to identify and address security vulnerability 
and protect the network from possible cyber attacks or cyber terrorism.”247  
While this particular proposal is the first step in establishing an interna-
tional governance of the Internet, the treaty does little to stop sites such as 
WikiLeaks since its focus is primarily on stopping cyber-terrorists and 
hackers.248  For the treaty to effectively halt WikiLeaks, the treaty must ad-
dress websites that post classified information and use language resembling 
the Espionage Act. 
In theory, an international treaty is a viable means of preventing the 
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dissemination of classified information.  Nevertheless, there are several 
problems with its implementation and ability for success.  First, there is no 
guarantee, and it is unlikely, that all countries will sign on to such a treaty.  
Even the U.S. may be wary of an Internet treaty as it could be seen as a 
means of limiting the First Amendment.249  However, assuming the U.S. 
did sign the treaty, it would not be useful without the support of all coun-
tries with Internet access signing the treaty, which is unlikely, and still 
there is no guarantee.  Participation of all countries is essential; otherwise, 
the information may be disseminated over the Internet without consequence 
by a country not privy to the treaty. 
Additionally, the process of drafting and implementing a treaty can be 
very lengthy.  For instance, the IGF was founded in 2006 and yet there is 
only one proposed treaty regarding any type of Internet protection.250  
Moreover, the IGF also has many different issues it must focus on, and se-
curity will not likely be the first topic it addresses.251  A treaty may be the 
best way to align international forces to solve the problem posed by 
WikiLeaks; however, its feasibility must be scrutinized carefully. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While a lawsuit enjoining the publication of classified documents in 
conjunction with an international treaty is an optimal solution to the prob-
lems WikiLeaks poses, these solutions lack the ultimate efficiency neces-
sary for the Internet Age, particularly in light of the fact that mirror sites 
can be posted instantaneously.252  In order to permanently halt WikiLeaks 
and similar websites from disclosing classified documents, a combination 
of all three methods should be applied. 
Changes in U.S. laws and the creation of an international treaty are 
excellent long-term goals.  First, the Espionage Act of 1917,253 as expanded 
by a law such as the proposed SHIELD Act,254 will more effectively enable 
the prosecution of distributors of WikiLeaks and the hosts of mirror sites.  
However, as mirror sites arise under new domain names,255 the U.S. will 
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ultimately need to use cyber-warfare if classified information continues to 
spread faster than the registries can remove it.  Finally, an international 
treaty would make it easier to prosecute individuals such as Julian Assange 
for violating various laws.  By combining these methods, lawmakers would 
achieve a balance to preserve civil liberties by restraining public informa-
tion only when justified while also protecting national security interests. 
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